For a company with 50 to 500 employees, the internet-facing VPN box is often the single weakest point in the whole network. A hacker who finds one unpatched flaw in that box doesn't just get a foothold - they can potentially walk straight into the entire office network behind it. That is why, for most firms in this size range, the practical answer to the VPN versus zero trust question has become clear: move to zero trust.
A traditional VPN works by granting remote staff a key to the whole house once they sign in correctly. Zero trust network access, known as ZTNA, works differently. It connects a person only to the specific applications their job requires, and it checks both the person and the device every time they ask for access, not just once at login. This is the model described in the federal zero trust guidance published by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and it reflects a broader shift in how security professionals think about remote access generally. Firms comparing providers and approaches sometimes start their research at a resource like http://buybestvpn.com, which outlines how traditional remote-access tools compare with newer models before committing budget to either path.
Why the VPN Box Became a Target
The mechanics explain the risk. A VPN appliance sits exposed to the open internet by design, because remote employees need to reach it. That makes it a constant target for scanning and probing. Attackers have repeatedly exploited flaws in these boxes before patches even existed, turning defense into a race that even a disciplined IT team cannot always win. Cyber insurer Coalition has reported that more than half of its 2024 ransomware claims traced back to a compromised VPN or firewall. The federal cybersecurity agency CISA separately maintains a running list of known exploited vulnerabilities that now includes dozens of flaws in VPN and firewall products from major vendors, with roughly half of those flaws tied to ransomware incidents. When one widely used vendor's VPN boxes were compromised in early 2024, CISA ordered every federal agency running them to disconnect and rebuild from scratch.
Zero trust removes that exposed login page entirely. There is no internet-facing VPN door for an attacker to knock on, because remote users never connect to the network itself - only to the applications they're authorized to use, authenticated continuously rather than once.
Where a VPN Still Makes Sense
The shift to zero trust doesn't mean VPNs disappear completely. Three narrow use cases remain legitimate. Site-to-site VPNs, which create an always-on link between two offices a company already owns, are a different tool entirely and can stay in place. Industrial and plant equipment that must be reachable from outside the building should, according to federal guidance, remain off the open internet and behind a VPN that requires a physical security key or similarly strong multi-factor authentication. And a small group of users can reasonably stay on a patched, MFA-protected VPN temporarily while their applications are migrated over.
Cost, Timeline and the MFA Question
Zero trust typically costs a few dollars per user each month, a fraction of what a single ransomware claim can cost a mid-sized firm. Migration is realistically a quarter-long project, moving one team and one application at a time while the existing VPN keeps running, so nobody loses access overnight. A common question is whether multi-factor authentication alone makes a VPN safe enough. The honest answer is: not entirely. Some VPN vulnerabilities allow attackers to bypass login screens altogether, and security teams have documented account takeovers even where MFA was active. MFA remains a valuable layer, but it is not, as one security practitioner put it, "a great tool, but not an end-all, be-all." Every remote path, including contractors and outside vendors, should be inventoried, secured, and eventually folded into a zero trust model rather than left on legacy access.